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Crisis-driven austerity measures adopted by some Eurozone Member States to satisfy the
conditions for receiving financial assistance have raised concerns over the level of protection
of fundamental rights afforded to individuals, and have thrown into sharp relief the
problems surrounding the efficiency and the lack of transparency of crisis management
mechanisms at the national and EU level. This contribution provides an overview of some
of the most prominent litigation arising in the context of financial assistance given to
Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus. Growing literature has examined the macroeconomic
adjustment programmes of these countries from a constitutional (viz. the legal competence
of the EU bailouts/bail-ins) and a social policy perspective (viz. the impact of the pro-
grammes on labour and employment social rights). Taking stock of these accounts, this
article seeks to provide an updated picture of the most relevant case law, focusing on the
position of the individual as a litigant.
The article does not purport to provide an all-encompassing or comparative analysis
of the litigation concerning the Eurozone bailouts. Such a challenging task would require
extensive analysis not only of cases brought before numerous national courts, but also of
the specifics of the national judicial systems of the three Eurozone Member States.1 Instead,
this contribution aims to bring together the main attempts that have taken place so far to
challenge measures adopted by the three Eurozone Member States in order to fulfill the
conditions for receiving financial assistance. To this effect, the article first explains the
concept of conditionality in the context of financial assistance (i). It then outlines some
of the most pertinent cases at the national level (ii) and discusses the litigation before the
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), focusing on recent developments in the case law con-
* Assistant Professor in EU law, Department of International and European Union Law, Erasmus School of
Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, karatzia@law.eur.nl.
The article is based on an on-going project about the role of the courts in the crisis, and on the presentation:
A. Karatzia, T. Konstadinides, “Who is responsible? The issue of liability in the context of the EU macro-
economic adjustment programmes and austerity measures”, delivered by the author in the XXVII FIDE
Congress Doctoral Workshop in May 2016.
1 For an example of discussion about country-specific case law see M. Canotilho, T. Violante, R. Lanceiro,
‘Austerity measures under judicial scrutiny: the Portuguese constitutional case law’, Vol. 11(1) E.C.L.Rev.,
2015, p. 155.
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cerning financial assistance by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (iii). It concludes
with an outlook on future developments in this saga of litigation. As a concise account of
relevant case law, the article could be of interest to anyone who wishes to follow the
development of the judicial responses to the Eurozone bailouts.
34.1 Introduction
A host of key crisis management mechanisms have been adopted at the supranational level
during the Eurozone financial and economic crisis with the aim of improving the economic
governance framework of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Besides the reforms
in the EMU budgetary constraints, mechanisms of financial stabilization that could provide
financial assistance to troubled Member States were also established.2 These include the
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF), both of which have been replaced by the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). Whilst the EFSM was adopted on the basis of EU law (Art. 122(2) TFEU) in
accordance with a Council Regulation, the EFSF was established by an agreement of the
Heads of State and Government of the Eurozone as a private company incorporated under
Luxembourg law, and the ESM on the basis of an international Treaty adopted by the
Eurozone Member States.3
As a result of the EMU’s legal overhaul, numerous judicial challenges concerning the
Eurozone crisis response mechanisms have been brought before both EU and national
courts. These cases can be categorised into two groups.4
Firstly, there are cases disputing the constitutionality of the revised construction of the
EMU. Inter alia, these include the seminal Pringle5 and Gauweiler (OMT)6 judgments of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It is well known by now that the cases started off as
domestic claims and reached the ECJ via preliminary reference requests from the Irish
and the German courts respectively. In this category of cases we can also include, among
2 For an overview see R. Smits, ‘The Crisis Response in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union: Overview
of Legal Developments’, Fordham Int’l L.J. 38(4), 2015, 1135.
3 See respectively: Consolidated Version of the European Financial Stability Facility Framework Agreement
(adopted 7 June 2010, entered into force 18 October 2011); Council Regulation 407/2010 OJ 2010 L118/1;
Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (adopted 2 February
2012, entered into force 27 September 2012) (hereinafter ESMT) and Council Decision No. 2011/199/EU
OJ 2011 L 91/1.
4 For a slightly different categorisation see A. Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective,
OUP, Oxford 2015, p. 122.
5 Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney
General, [2012] ECR I-756.
6 Judgment of 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Peter Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, [2015] ECR
I-400.
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others, the Estonian challenge to the constitutionality of the ESM Treaty (ESMT), and the
French challenge to the ratification of the Fiscal Compact.7
Secondly, there are cases adjudicated at the national and EU level concerning the
adoption and implementation of macroeconomic adjustment programmes (i.e. of the
programmes establishing the conditions for financial assistance), in which applicants
contested some of the measures that were adopted by Member States for implementing
these programmes. This category includes cases brought by individuals, and associations
of individuals, regarding the Greek, Portuguese, and Cyprus bailouts (or ‘bail-in’ in the
case of Cyprus).8 The three Member States received financial assistance in different forms;
either as a bilateral loan complemented by arrangements with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), or through the EFSM, EFSF, or ESM.
This article focuses on the second set of cases, which concern the implementation of
the macroeconomic adjustment programmes by the Member States in need of financial
assistance. It begins by explaining the procedure for the provision of financial assistance
to the Member State requesting assistance, and the reasons why individuals may wish to
contest the legality of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes. It will then briefly
discuss the most prominent case law from national courts in Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus,
highlighting some of the similarities or differences in their approach. Subsequently, it will
turn to the (currently) limited yet significant litigation at the EU level to explain the most
pertinent questions currently facing the CJEU in the context of financial assistance under
the ESM. Since the ESM is the EU’s permanent crisis resolution mechanism for Eurozone
Member States, questions concerning its function, scope, and reach are not only apposite
to the pending cases, but also with regard to future financial assistance packages.
7 Estonian Supreme Court, Constitutional Case No. 3-4-1-6-12, judgment of 12 July 2012; France Constitu-
tional Court Decision no 2012-653 DC, judgment of 9 August 2012; For an analysis see S. Bardutzsky and
E. Fahey, ‘Who got to adjudicate the EU’s financial crisis and why? Judicial review of the instruments of a
postnational legal order: adjudicating the practices of the Eurozone’ in M. Adams, F. Fabbrini, P. Larouche
(Eds.), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints, Hart, Oxford 2014; F. Fabbrini, ‘The
Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in Comparative Perspective’, Berkeley
J. Int’l Law, Vol. 32, 2014.
8 Ireland was also a recipient of a financial assistance package, see http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assis-
tance_eu_ms/ireland/index_en.htm; Spain received only partial financial assistance by the ESM for the
purpose of recapitalising its banking system and thus the details of its agreement with the ESM are different
in nature than those of the other four Member States. With regard to the distinction between ‘bailout’ and
‘bail-in’, this has been explained as follows: “The term bail-out describes a rescue operation in which the
onus is placed on external investors or the taxpayer. The term ‘bail-in’ refers to a rescue operation in which
the bank’s creditors are obliged to agree to have a portion of their debt written off.” See Advocate General
Wathelet in Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Mallis and Malli v. Commission and Central Bank,
delivered on 21 April 2016, para. 34 (hereinafter AG Wathelet).
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34.1.1 Conditionality and Liability
The starting point of the subsequent discussion is that financial assistance to Eurozone
Member States in need can be provided only on the basis of strict conditionality. Such
conditionality was attached to assistance given under the 2010 Greek bilateral loan, the
EFSF and the EFSM, and applies also to assistance given under the ESM. The EFSF
Framework Agreement, the Regulation establishing the EFSM, and the ESM Treaty (ESMT)
all require that financial assistance is conditional upon the implementation of certain
economic policy conditions by the Member State. These economic policies are contained
in the so-called ‘macroeconomic adjustment programmes.’9
In a nutshell, the process of negotiating and agreeing on conditionality was similar
under the EFSF and the EFSM:10 the national authorities of the recipient Member State
negotiated the adjustment programme with officials from the Commission, the ECB, and
the IMF (i.e. the ‘Troika’) and submitted their Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs)
which then needed to be formally approved by the competent body for each programme.
For EFSM assistance this was the Council, and for EFSF assistance it was the Eurogroup
Working Group. The terms of the conditionality were included in a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU), and the most important terms were repeated in a Council Imple-
menting Decision adopted under Articles 126(6), 126(9), and 136 TFEU and addressed to
the borrowing Member State.
Under the provisions for financial assistance by the ESM, the negotiation and signing
of the programmes is a task of the Commission acting on behalf of the ESM Board of
Governors (Art. 13 ESMT).11 Article 13 of the ESMT describes the process for granting
stability support to ESM Members. After receiving a request from a Member State, the
Board of Governors entrusts the Commission and the ECB to undertake the necessary
assessments of the country’s public debt and financing needs, and of the risk posed by the
country’s financial situation to euro area as a whole. On the basis of that assessment, the
ESM Board of Governors decides whether to grant stability support to the said State in the
form of a ‘financial assistance facility.’ If the ESM Board of Governors decides to grant
stability support to a requesting Member State, it entrusts the Commission and the ECB
“with the task of negotiating with the ESM Member concerned, [an MoU] detailing the
9 See generally European Parliament, DG for Internal Policies, Committee Study on the State of Play in
Implementing Macroeconomic Adjustment Programmes in the Euro Area: www.europarl.europa.eu/doc-
ument/activities/cont/201402/20140219ATT79589/20140219ATT79589EN.pdf.
10 For this explanation and a detailed analysis of conditionality see M. Ioannidis, ‘EU Financial Assistance
Conditionality after “Two Pack”’ 2014 p. 12 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398914; M. Ioannidis, ‘How Strict
is “Strict Conditionality”? The New Eurozone Agreement on Greece’ 2015 http://europeanlaw-
blog.eu/?p=2716.
11 The ESM Board of Governors is a body currently comprised of the finance ministers of the Eurozone
countries i.e. currently the same actors as those formulating the Eurogroup.
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conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility” (Art. 13(3) ESMT). In other
words, the conditions of such ‘financial assistance facility’ are negotiated and agreed
between, on the one hand, the Commission and the ECB and, on the other hand, the bor-
rowing Member State – and in some cases the IMF (Art. 3 ESMT).12 The two EU Institu-
tions, however, are not acting under the EU legal order, but rather as agents of the ESM.13
In addition, Regulation 472/2013, which is discussed later in this article, sets out the pro-
cedure for the approval of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes by the Council,
and gives to the Commission the role of ensuring that “the [MoU] signed by the Commis-
sion on behalf of the ESM is fully consistent with the macroeconomic adjustment pro-
gramme approved by the Council.”14
Although Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus received assistance under different mechanisms,
they all committed to fulfilling the economic policy conditions set out in the macroeconomic
adjustment programme prepared for each country. To refresh the memory of the reader,
while the loan conditions for Portugal and Ireland were based both on the EFSM and the
EFSF, Greece received funding from the wholly bilateral Greek Loan Facility (the first
bailout), then exclusively from the intergovernmental EFSF (the second bailout), and the
third time from the ESM (the third bailout), whilst Cyprus received financial assistance
from the ESM. Even though the specific objectives of each State’s programme differed, the
overall aim of the programmes was “to return Member States to sound macroeconomic
or financial health and restore their capacity to meet their public-sector obligations.”15
Since a primary target of the adjustment programmes concerns fiscal consolidation vis-à-
vis government deficits, the programmes include measures that aim to reduce public
spending and reform social benefits and pensions, thus potentially affecting matters
“ranging from that country’s financial system and labour market, to the judiciary.”16
The measures adopted by the Member States in receipt of financial assistance are said
to have come at the expense of fundamental and social rights’ protection not only because
of their content but also because of the procedures in which they were adopted.17 Procedu-
rally, for example, the negotiation and conclusion of financial assistance programmes for
12 Case C-370/12, Pringle para. 72.
13 For a detailed analysis of the constitutional issues regarding the role of the EU Institutions in the functioning
of the ESM arising from the case of Pringle see P. Craig, ‘Pringle and the Nature of Legal Reasoning’,
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2014, p. 205; and S. Peers, ‘Towards a New Form
of EU Law? The Use of EU Institutions outside the EU Legal Framework’, Vol. 9 E.C.L.Rev., 2013 p. 38.
14 Art. 7(2) of Regulation 472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member
States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial
stability, 2013, OJ L 140/1.
15 Court of Auditors Special Report on Financial assistance provided to countries in difficulties, 2015,
www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR15_18/SR_CRISIS_SUPPORT_EN.pdf p. 11.
16 M. Ioannides, 2014, p. 17.
17 A. Baraggia, ‘Conditionality measures within the euro area crisis’, Vol. 4(2), C.J.I.C.L. 2015, pp. 268-288;
M. Ioannidis, 2014, p. 14.
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Greece and Portugal took place without, or after very limited, social dialogue and consul-
tation between the government and social partners.18 The European Parliament and national
parliaments often had a limited say in the negotiations and the agreement on the specific
measures.19 The MoUs’ negotiations are also notorious for their lack of transparency, whilst
a recent report from the European Court of Auditors highlighted inconsistencies in the
treatment of countries that were in a comparable situation.20 Substantially, the measures
have brought to the fore concerns over the human rights impact of the crisis and have
sparked academic discussion on the role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the
negotiations and agreements over the financial assistance packages.21 International
organisations and committees have highlighted the increase of unemployment and social
exclusion in the recipient Member States.22
As mentioned already, some of these austerity measures can arguably be traced back
to the conditionality that characterises the provision of financial assistance. Yet the extent
of responsibility for the conditions of the bailouts remains undetermined.23 For individuals,
uncertainty regarding the ‘ownership’24 of these programmes affects their attempts to
attribute liability or claim compensation for harm resulting from measures and policies
adopted on the basis of the MoUs. With this in mind, the next section outlines some of
the attempts that have taken place to challenge the conditionality of the financial assistance
programmes before Greek, Portuguese, and Cyprus courts.
18 A. Koukiadaki, ‘Can the austerity measures be challenged in supranational courts?’, Analysis for ETUC,
2014, www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/publication/files/austerity_greeceportugal_en_3.pdf p. 19.
19 A. Poulou, ‘Austerity and European Social Rights: How can Courts Protect Europe’s Lost Generation?’ Vol.
15(6), German Law Journal 2014, p. 1152; Baraggia, 2015, p. 285.
20 Court of Auditors, 2015. The Report of the Court of Auditors states: ‘When comparing countries with
similar structural weaknesses, it was found that the required reforms were not always in proportion to the
problems faced or that they pursued widely different paths.’ Having said that, the Report also stated that
‘the programmes were successful in prompting reforms’ pp. 8-9; Also see A. Poulou, 2015, pp. 1151-1154.
21 See M. Salomon, ‘Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions’ LSE Working Papers 2/2015,
2015, p. 2; C. Barnard, ‘The Charter, the Court – and the Crisis’, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law
Research Paper No. 18/2013, 2013; C. Kilpatrick, ‘Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge Because
They Are Not EU Law?’ Vol. 10, EuConst, 2014 p. 393; C. Kilpatrick, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic
Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal Values in Europe’s Bailouts’, Vol. 35(2), Oxford J Legal Studies,
2015, p. 325; A. Nolan, ‘Not fit for purpose? Human rights in times of financial and economic crisis’, Vol.
4, H.R.L.R., 2015, p. 360.
22 For example, certain austerity measures adopted by Greece to satisfy the requirements of financial assistance
programmes have been considered incompatible with international instruments ratified by Greece. See A.
Bernard (ed.), ‘Downgrading Rights: the cost of austerity in Greece’ FIDL/HLHR Report, 2014,
www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/greece/greece-report-unveils-human-rights-violations-stem-
ming-from-austerity. See Study for the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament, ‘The impact of the
crisis on fundamental rights across Member States of the EU: Comparative Analysis’ PE 510.021, 2015.
23 M. Salomon, 2015, p. 17; C. Kilpatrick, 2014, pp. 393-407.
24 M. Ioannidis, 2015.
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34.1.2 Litigation at the National Level
Attempts to claim redress have taken place at the national level, where the most prominent
case law has come from Greek and Portuguese courts, and concerned reductions in salaries
and pensions. Against a rather different background, cases were also brought before the
Supreme Court of Cyprus to challenge the national measures adopted for the restructuring
of the financial sector which took place in 2013 in the run-up to the agreement on a
financial assistance programme for the country.
The Portuguese Constitutional Court is said to have been vocal in terms of asserting
review of domestic budgetary measures that were adopted by the Portuguese government
as part of the bailout agreement to receive a rescue package from the EFSM, the EFSF, and
the IMF.25 Examples of such measures include pay cuts in the wages of public sector
workers, and legislation concerning pay cuts in the pensions of retired citizens.26 Challenges
were also brought by associations of individuals before Portuguese Labour Courts, some
of which resulted to preliminary reference questions for the ECJ.27
The most well-known line of cases concerns the constitutional challenges to provisions
of the Portuguese 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 Budget Acts.28 Whilst initially the Portuguese
Constitutional Court found that the salary reductions prescribed by the 2011 Budget Act
for the income of civil servants were not unconstitutional in the light of the economic sit-
uation of the country,29 its approach changed over time. Regarding the 2012 Budget Act,
the Court found that provisions which suspended the 14th monthly salary and allowed
for temporary pension and wage cuts in the public sector were excessive and unconstitu-
tional, yet it suspended the effects of its ruling as an acknowledgment of the exceptional
public interest of the Portuguese state to keep receiving external financial aid.30 Subse-
25 F. Fabbrini, 2014, pp. 100-103; R. Cisotta, D. Gallo, ‘The Portuguese Constitutional Court Case Law on
Austerity Measures: A Reappraisal’ in C. Kilpatrick, B. de Witte (Eds.), ‘Social Rights in Times of Crisis in
the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights’ Challenges’ EUI Working Papers, 2014, p. 85.
26 Since we are currently discussing the cases from the individual’s perspective, it is worth noting that the
constitutional review mechanism in Portugal was in fact triggered not by individuals but by Parliamentarians,
the Ombudsman or the President of the Portuguese Republic. See M. Canotilho et al., 2015, pp. 158-159;
As commented, in Portugal there was a ‘general discontent of people but there has not been a culture of
judicial challenges.’ M.N. de Brito, ‘Putting Social Rights in Brackets? The Portuguese Experience with
Welfare Challenges in Times of Crisis’ in C. Kilpatrick and B. de Witte (Eds.), 2014 p. 77.
27 See infra, Section iii.
28 C. Fasone, ‘Constitutional Courts Facing the Euro Crisis: Italy, Portugal and Spain in a Comparative Per-
spective’, European University Institute Working Paper MWP 2014/25, 2014.
29 Portuguese Constitutional Court Decision no 396/2011, judgment of 21 September 2011.
30 Portuguese Constitutional Court Decision no 353/2012, judgment of 5 July 2012; F. Fabbrini and EUI
Working Paper; Ribeiro explains the impact of this judgment: “The Government would thereby have to
pay both subsidies in 2012, an expenditure not foreseen in that year’s budget. Since there was no time to
design policy alternatives that could compensate the imbalance, the decision would imply a serious aggra-
vation of the budget deficit.” G.A. Ribeiro, ‘Judicial Activism Against Austerity in Portugal’, Int’l J. Const.
L. Blog, 2013, www.iconnectblog.com/2013/12/judicial-activism-against-austerity-in-portugal/.
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quently, provisions in the 2013 Budget Act which inter alia required pay cuts for public
sector workers were found to violate the constitutional principle of proportional equality;
the objective of reducing the public deficit was not accepted as a justification.31 This time
the Portuguese court did not suspend its judgment, thus obliging the Portuguese Govern-
ment to reconsider the measures in question. Notably, the Portuguese Court struck down
the austerity measures on grounds such as that the measures breached constitutional
principles (i.e. equality, legal certainty, and protection of legitimate expectations) rather
than on the basis of the individuals’ right to work or other social rights.32 Alternatively –
if the degree of judicial protection had been based on individual constitutional rights – it
would have been easier to modify the scope of those rights through a constitutional reform
than it would be to modifying the constitutional framework on which the Portuguese
Court relied.33
The above development of the Portuguese case law was said to signal a progressively
more active approach by the Portuguese Court in reviewing measures of financial stabiliza-
tion and economic adjustment.34 This conclusion, however, could be nuanced in light of
more recent commentary stressing that the Portuguese Constitutional Court also found
a number of austerity measures allegedly encroaching on fundamental rights to be consti-
tutional.35 Furthermore, the approach of the Portuguese Court has not been without criti-
cism, especially from commentators arguing that the Court did not take sufficiently into
consideration the wider European context of the crisis. In this wider context, the political
choices of the Portuguese Government under review by the Court were inevitably influenced
by – and had to respect – the positions of other Member States and those of the country’s
international creditors, meaning that the Court also had to respect the delicate political
negotiations that preceded the adoption of the budgetary measures in question.36
In comparison with the Portuguese Constitutional Court litigation, in Greece the most
relevant legal challenges arose indirectly through requests for annulment of general
administrative acts executing legal provisions.37 Contrary to the Portuguese Constitutional
Court, the Greek Council of State is an administrative court and therefore cannot rule
directly on the constitutionality of legislation or repeal legislation.38 Instead, as the country’s
supreme administrative court, the Greek Council of State can adjudicate disputes for
31 Portuguese Constitutional Court Decision n. 187/2013, judgment of 5 April 2013.
32 M. Canotilho et al., 2015, pp. 182-183.
33 Ibid.
34 Fabbrini, 2014, pp. 100-103; C. Fasone, 2014.
35 M. Canotilho et al., pp. 182-183.
36 Ribeiro, 2013; Also see R. Gissota, D. Gallo, ‘The Portuguese Constitutional Court Case Law on Austerity
Measures: A Reappraisal’ LUISS Academy Working Paper 4/2014.
37 See A.I. Marketou, M. Dekastros, ‘Constitutional Change through Eurocrisis law: Greece’, available at:
http://eurocrisislaw.eui.eu/Greece.
38 A. Dimopoulos, ‘Constitutional Review of Austerity Measures in the Eurozone Crisis’, 3 September 2013,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2320234.
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compensation concerning the liability of government, local government, and public entities.
Claimants cannot seek to annul legislation directly but they can ask the Council of State
to declare that the legal basis of certain administrative decisions does not produce any
legal effect in the case at hand.39
Two cases illustrate the approach of the Greek Council of State to the first and second
package of financial assistance, even though they cannot provide any conclusive evidence
of the entirety of the Greek crisis litigation.40 With regard to the country’s first economic
programme, a challenge was brought before the Greek Council of State contesting the
wages’ and benefit cuts that were imposed through Law 3845/2010 in order to ratify the
respective MoU.41 The statute was contested on the grounds that it violated the right to
property (Art. 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, Article 17 of the Greek Constitution, and the
principle of proportionality (Art. 25(1) of the Greek Constitution). The Greek Council of
State relied on the ‘state of emergency’ doctrine and concluded that, although the measures
interfered with property rights enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, they
served the overlaying public interest of consolidating public finances and were not dispro-
portionate to the objective pursued. In this way, the Court included for the first time the
fiscal interest of the country into the concept of public interest which could justify funda-
mental rights’ restrictions.42
More recently, the Greek Council of State applied a similar rationale of emergency to
a challenge by nine trade unions concerning measures ratifying the second MoU and
allowing the legislator to remove a number of issues from the scope of collective bargaining
and collective agreements.43 The court found that the state intervention was exceptional
and the measures were proportionate. Notably, this time the court did not refer to the
‘overarching financial public interest’ that it had developed in the first case.44 Instead, it
examined the constitutionality of the measures vis-à-vis reasons of ‘higher social interest’
that could only be invoked under strict preconditions (e.g. that the core of the constitutional
right in question must not be neutralized). However, as commented, it is currently difficult
39 As explained by A.I. Marketou, M. Dekastros, ‘Constitutional Change through Eurocrisis law: Greece’,
available at: http://eurocrisislaw.eui.eu/Greece.
40 For a more extensive analysis of the case law see: D.M. Tsakiri, ‘The Protection of the Fundamental Social
Rights in the Greek Legal System’ ANESC Papers, 2015.
41 Greek Council of State Decision 668/2012 (20 February 2012).
42 M. Yiannakourou, ‘Challenging austerity measures affecting work rights at domestic and international
level. The case of Greece’ in C. Kilpatrick, B. de Witte, 2014, pp. 22-23; A.I. Marketou, ‘Economic Emergency
and the loss of faith in Greek Constitution’, Vol. 4(2) C.J.I.CL. 2015 pp. 307-309; P. Pikrammenos, ‘Public
law in extraordinary circumstances from the point of view of the administrative procedure for annulment’,
2012, Epitheorissis Ergatikou Dikaiou, p. 385.
43 Greek Council of State Decision 2307/2014; M. Yiannakourou, ‘Labour measures of Memorandum II before
the Greek Council of State: Decision 2307/2014 (Plenum)’ Decision 2307/2014, 2014, http://eurocrisis-
law.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Greek-Council-of-State-2307_2014.pdf.
44 Ibid.
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to evaluate whether this change in approach might have long-term implications on future
litigation, or whether it should be perceived as yet another attempt by the Greek Council
of State to “maintain a balance between self-restraint and guaranteeing [fundamental]
rights.”45
Finally, individuals have gone to national courts in Cyprus in an attempt to impose
liability on Cyprus national authorities for the so-called ‘haircut of deposits’ that took place
in 2013 before signing an MoU for financial assistance from the ESM. Given the troubled
banking sector of the country, the purpose of the haircut was to recapitalise Bank of Cyprus,
one of the two biggest banks, using portions of the holdings of shareholders, bond holders,
and uninsured depositors.46 The second troubled bank, namely Laiki Bank, was resolved
and split into a ‘good bank’ and a ‘bad bank’. Whilst the ‘good bank’ was used for the
recapitalisation of the Bank of Cyprus, the ‘bad bank’ ceased to exist. The measures resulted
in an extensive write-off of Cypriot and foreign bank deposits (the so-called ‘haircut’).
Numerous appeals were filed in the Supreme Court of Cyprus by depositors of Laiki
Bank and Bank of Cyprus. In June 2013, the Court issued a judgment over 55 such appeals.47
The claimants sought to annul two Decrees (hereinafter Decree 103 and 104) issued by
the Central Bank of Cyprus on 29 March 2013 on the basis of the 2013 Resolution Law.48
Decree 103 provided for the recapitalisation of Bank of Cyprus. Decree 104 provided for
the resolution of Laiki Bank by transferring all deposits below 100,000 Euros to the Bank
of Cyprus and by writing-off all deposits above 100,000 Euros. The applicants had argued
that the contested Decrees impinged on their constitutionally guaranteed rights to property
(Art. 23) and were violating the constitutional principle of equality and non-discrimination
(Art. 28).
Contrary to the Greek and Portuguese courts, the Supreme Court of Cyprus did not
engage in a constitutional review of the relevant acts. It found that the applicants did not
have standing; they lacked legitimate interest because the contested acts concerned matters
of private (i.e. between the bank and its depositors), rather than public law, and therefore
fell outside the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.49 According to the Court, the alleged
45 Ibid.; X. Contiades, Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparative Analysis, Routledge, Oxon
2013, p. 208.
46 For a detailed discussion, see P. Charalambous, ‘Cyprus: A bad “haircut” is not easily forgotten’, Financial
Regulation International, 2013.
47 Christodoulou v. Central Bank of Cyprus, Case No. 551/2013 (hereinafter Christodoulou).
48 The 2013 Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Law (Basic Law) L17(I)/2013, 22 March 2013. The
2013 Decree on the bailing in of Bank of Cyprus, Regulatory Administrative Act No. 103, EE, Annex III
(I), No. 4645, 769-80, 29 March 2013 (hereafter Decree 103); The 2013 Decree on the sale of certain operations
of Laiki, Regulatory Administrative Act No. 104, EE, Annex III(I), No. 4645, 781-88, 29 March 2013
(hereafter Decree 104).
49 According to Art. 146 of the Cyprus Constitution, the Supreme Court of Cyprus has jurisdiction to review
the legality of acts, decisions and omissions issued or noticed in the exercise of executive or administrative
power of organs and authorities of the State (Art. 146(1)). Recourse to the Supreme Court of Cyprus may
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effect of the Decrees on the depositors’ rights concerned the contractual obligations of the
banks towards their depositors or investors and thus fell under the scope of private law.
As such, the claimants should first and foremost go against the banks if they wished to
bring legal proceedings. These legal proceedings should take place before District Courts,
which were also the appropriate fora to potentially award monetary damages to the
applicants. Any claim as to the responsibility of the Republic of Cyprus could arise inci-
dentally in these civil actions before the District Courts.50
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court judgment, cases are pending before Cyprus
District Courts, whilst the possibility of preliminary references to the ECJ from these lower
courts under Article 267 TFEU is not excluded. Such references may seek to clarify the
EU law dimension of the cases, including the involvement of the EU Institutions in the
bail-in.51 In light of this possibility, the next section provides an overview of the main cases
that have arisen before the CJEU in the context of financial assistance to Eurozone Member
States.
34.1.3 Litigation at the EU Level
Some of the applicants in the above mentioned cases found their way before the CJEU to
challenge the measures arising from the conditionality measures or claim damages for
financial losses allegedly resulting from such measures. Cases concerning the Portuguese
and Greek bail-out and the Cypriot bail-in were brought before the CJEU either on the
basis of Article 267 TFEU (preliminary references from national courts), or 263 TFEU
(direct action against EU institutions) and 340 TFEU (action for damages against EU
institutions).
The first few cases, concerning the Portuguese and Greek bailouts, have already attracted
academics’ attention.52 Specifically the preliminary reference requests sent by Portuguese
Labour Courts illustrated the difficulties with identifying a link between the MoUs and
be made by ‘a person whose any existing legitimate interest, which he has either as a person, or by virtue
of being a member of a community is adversely and directly affected by such a decision or act or omission’
(Art. 146(2)).
50 For earlier commentaries on the case see J Giotaki, ‘The Cypriot “Bail-in” Litigation’, Butterworths Journal
of International Banking and Financial Law, 2015, p. 485; According to Cyprus Supreme Court, the relevant
test to be applied by the District Courts for the purposes of deciding on compensation for the depositors
should be based on the ‘no-creditor-worse-off principle’, i.e. whether as a result of the measures in question
have caused the depositors greater loss than what would have been incurred if the measures had not been
adopted (either because the two banks had been resolved under normal insolvency proceedings or because
an alternative bailout had taken place), Christodoulou p. 37.
51 Christodoulou p. 37; It can be said here that, to an extent, the possibility for a preliminary reference request
also depends on the outcome of the cases by Cypriot depositors currently pending before the CJEU, see
infra Section iii.
52 See for example C. Kilpatrick, 2014; A. Hinarejos 2014.
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EU law that would allow the ECJ to answer the Portuguese Court’s questions on the com-
patibility of public sector cuts with the Charter.53 According to the ECJ, the applicants did
not demonstrate a link between the national measure in question and EU law. Since the
Portuguese State Budget Act under consideration was not implementing EU law – a link
which is a sine qua non for the application of Article 51(1) of the Charter to the Member
States – the ECJ held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. In response to the judg-
ments, academic commentators have called for a more active approach by the ECJ in
finding a link between national measures implementing MoU conditions and EU law –
by virtue of the Council Decisions adopting the macroeconomic adjustment programmes
– even if this would mean that the Court would then exercise restraint in reviewing the
cases on their merits.54 Others have advocated a more active review by the CJEU of financial
assistance conditions, both on procedural and substantive grounds.55
The link between EU law and MoUs or, more generally, between EU law and the con-
ditionality for financial assistance to Eurozone Member States, has come to the spotlight
more recently after recent judgments of the General Court (GC) in two sets of cases initiated
by Cypriot depositors who suffered monetary losses as a result of the bail-in described
previously.56 The cases deal particularly with the haircut of deposits perceived as a condition
for financial assistance for the country from the ESM. Most of the cases from each set of
cases are currently under appeal.
In the first set of cases before the GC57 (hereinafter Mallis) the applicants had requested
the annulment under Article 263 TFEU of the Eurogroup statement that announced the
restructuring of the banking sector in Cyprus. The applicants’ claim was based on the
rationale that the two (national) Decrees that provided for the said restructuring (i.e.
Decrees 103 and 104) were the implementation of decisions taken at the EU level by the
Eurogroup, which were then communicated through the contested Eurogroup statement.
53 Ibid.; Order of 7 March 2013, Case 128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and Others v. BPN [2013] ECR
I-149; Order of 16 June 2014, Case C-264/12, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins [2014]
ECR I-2036; Order of 21 October 2014, Case C-665/13, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e
Afins [2014] ECR I-2327; All the references asked whether legal reforms that took place in Portugal in order
to receive financial assistance were contrary the Charter.
54 A. Hinarejos, 2014, p. 122.
55 A. Poulou, 2014, p. 1175.
56 See supra fn. 8.
57 Orders of 16 October 2014 in Cases T-237/13 to T-331/13. The nature of the claims and the orders are
almost identical, except for the amount of amount of financial losses the claimants are said to have suffered.
Reference to Mallis in this article refers to Case T-327/13, Mallis and Malli v. Commission and ECB [2014]
ECR I-909 and implies reference to the other four cases as well. For commentary see A. Karatzia, ‘Cypriot
Depositors Before the Court of Justice of the European Union: Knocking on the Wrong Door?’ Vol. 26(2)
KLJ, 2015, p. 175. Five cases from this group are currently on appeal: Cases C-105/15P, Mallis and Malli v.
Commission and ECB; C-106/15P Tameio Pronoias Prosopikou Trapezas Kyprou v. Commission and ECB;
C-107/15P Chatzithoma v. Commission and ECB; C-108/15P Chatziioannou v. Commission and ECB, C-
109/15P Nikolaou v. Commission and ECB.
584
Anastasia Karatzia
Acknowledging, perhaps, that the decisions of the Eurogroup would not be subjected to
judicial review under Article 263 TFEU, the applicants argued that the Commission and
the ECB were the de facto authors of the contested statement.
Indeed, the GC held that the Eurogroup was an informal political forum for discussion
which is not able to adopt legally binding decisions, and thus its acts cannot be subject to
judicial review by the CJEU. Moreover, the Eurogroup “could not be regarded as being
under the control of the Commission or the ECB, or as an agent of those institutions”
(Para. 44). The GC then considered whether the contested statement should be attributed
to the ESM and, if so, whether the ESM could be seen as being controlled by the Commis-
sion and the ECB. According to the applicants, this line of connection between the ESM
and the contested Eurogroup statement would mean that the statement originated from
the two EU institutions and should be subjected to judicial review. Relying on Pringle, the
GC dismissed this argument as well. Neither of the two EU institutions has the power to
control the ESM since their acts under the ESMT are binding only on the ESM.
In the second group of cases58 (hereinafter Ledra) the GC considered a claim for com-
pensation under Article 340 TFEU and Article 268 TFEU (i.e. non-contractual liability of
EU institutions). The applicants sought to argue that the Commission and the ECB should
compensate them with an amount “equivalent to the diminution in value of the deposits”
that the applicants had lost as a result of the enforcement of Decrees 103 and 104 (Para.
24). They argued that the damage for which they sought compensation resulted from the
conditions attached to the financial assistance provided to the Republic of Cyprus. Their
argument was that the conditions, which were stipulated in the MoU adopted jointly by
the ESM and the Republic of Cyprus on 26 April 2013, were in fact imposed on the
Republic of Cyprus by the Commission and the ECB.
According to the GC, the adoption of the MoU did not originate from the Commission
and the ECB, since the two institutions do not have any powers to make decisions of their
own under the ESMT.59 The GC also made it clear that the claim was inadmissible in so
far as it contested the legality of certain provisions of the MoU adopted by the ESM and
the Republic of Cyprus; the MoU was not an act of the ‘institutions, bodies, offices or
agencies of the European Union’ that could be challenged on the basis of Article 263 TFEU
(Para. 44).
The GC also interpreted the argument of the applicant from an alternative angle, i.e.
as arguing that the Commission should be liable for damages for infringing its “obligation
58 Orders of 10 November 2014, in Cases T-289/13 to T-294/13. References to Ledras in this article refers to
Case T-289/13, Ledra Advertising Ltd v. Commission and ECB, [2014] ECR I-981 and implies reference to
the other five cases as well. Three cases from this group are currently on appeal, see Cases C-8/15P, Ledra
Advertising v. Commission and ECB; C-9/15P, E. Eleftheriou and L. Papachristofi v. Commission and ECB;
and C-10/15P, Theofilou v. Commission and ECB.
59 Case C-370/12, Pringle para. 161.
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to guarantee that the MoU is in conformity with EU law” which allegedly arose out of the
Commission’s role as the guardian of the Treaties under Article 17 TEU (Para. 49). In this
regard, the GC examined whether the alleged conduct of the Commission could amount
to non-contractual liability for the EU under Article 340 TFEU. It found that an action
for damages under Article 340 manifestly lacked any foundation in law because there was
no established causal nexus between the damage in question and the alleged inaction of
the Commission, since the MoU was signed after the reduction of the applicants’ deposits
(Para. 54).
The cases constitute the first tangible manifestation of issued ruled upon by the ECJ
in the case of Pringle. In this sense, they go to the core of questions on the justiciability of
financial assistance conditionality. Two recently published Advocate General (AG) Opinions
on the cases provide rich insight into whether ESM conditionality measures can be chal-
lengeable, the potential basis of a legal challenge, and the role of the Commission and the
ECB in the negotiations and signing of the MoUs under the ESMT. AG Wathelet gave his
Opinion on the five appeals from the first group of cases (Mallis),60 and AG Wahl opined
on the three appeals from the second group of cases (Ledra).61 They both agreed that the
appeals should be dismissed.62 Space precludes a detailed discussion of the several issues
raised in the cases and the Opinions. Instead, we will subsequently touch upon two key
issues which are directly linked with individuals’ attempts to find an avenue through which
to contest, or impose liability for the ESM financial assistance conditionality.
The first issue is whether financial assistance conditionality can be contested via a direct
action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU. In this regard the GC in Ledra was clear:
conditionality under the ESM as set out in the MoUs cannot be challenged on the basis of
EU law before the CJEU. The MoUs are acts adopted by the ESM and the Member State
in need of financial assistance. According to Article 5(6)(g) of the ESMT, the economic
policy conditionality that accompanies the financial assistance given to Member States in
difficulty is defined by the Board of Governors of the ESMT, which means that the CJEU
has no jurisdiction to dispose of an action for annulment against such conditionality. Since
the ESM is an intergovernmental agreement to which the EU is not a party, the acts of the
ESM are ‘extraneous to the EU legal order’ even if some EU Institutions (i.e. the Commis-
sion and the ECB) are given a role under the ESMT.63
Given that the MoUs fall outside the EU legal order, national measures adopted on the
basis of these MoUs do not constitute implementation of EU law by the Member States.64
60 AG Wathelet supra fn. 8.
61 AG Wahl Opinion in Joined Cases C-8/15P, C-9/15P, C-10/15P (hereinafter AG Wahl).
62 For a commentary see R. Smits ‘ESM conditionality in court: two Advocate Generals on 14 Cypriot appeal
cases pending in Luxembourg’, AGEL blog, 2016, http://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2016/04/22/esmconditionality-
incourttwoadvocategeneralson14cypriotappealcasespendinginluxembourg/.
63 AG Wahl, paras. 52-53; Case C-370/12, Pringle, para. 161.
64 AG Wathelet, para. 84.
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Hence the CJEU cannot scrutinise the compliance with EU law of national measures
adopted by the Member States to observe their obligations under the MoUs (e.g. through
potential preliminary reference requests). In his Opinion, however, AG Wathelet notes
that some of the conditions that are stipulated in the MoUs are reproduced in a Council
Decision. He then indicates that the measures that are reproduced in a Decision adopted
by the Council after the signature of the MoU constitute implementation of EU law even
though an MoU is not an act of EU law (Para. 89). Notably, the AG refers to Regulation
472/2013, reinstating that the Regulation aims to “[enshrine in Union law] full consistency
between the TFEU multilateral surveillance framework and the possible policy conditions
attached to financial assistance”65 and in this way reinforce the link between ESM condi-
tionality and EU law (Para. 92). As mentioned earlier, Article 7 of Regulation 472/2013
sets out the procedure for the preparation and agreement of a macroeconomic adjustment
programme. According to Article 7(2) of the Regulation, the Council needs to approve
the macroeconomic adjustment programme and “the Commission shall ensure that the
[MoU] signed by the Commission on behalf of the ESM or the EFSF is fully consistent
with the macroeconomic adjustment programme approved by the Council.”
Reading the AG Wathelet’s commentary alone, one would be inclined to think that
there is, indeed, a way for some of the measures implementing the MoUs to be directly
challenged before EU Courts by virtue of the link identified between the MoUs and EU
law.66 However, the line of argument does not stop there. AG Wathelet continues by
explaining that, even if these Council Decisions bring the measures within the scope of
EU law, the non-privileged applicants who wish to contest the Council Decisions before
the CJEU will still find in their way the infamous Plaumann67 standing test under Article
263 TFEU. In particular, when it comes to the Council Decisions in question, individuals
will find it difficult – if not impossible – to show that the Decisions are of direct concern
to them and thus to satisfy the first limb of the Plaumann test.
The obstacle facing potential applicants is illustrated by the case of ADEDY, where
Greek civil servants attempted to contest MoU-implementing measures by going after the
Council Decision on excessive deficit addressed to Greece.68 The applicants were found
to lack direct concern because of the wide discretion left to the Hellenic Republic to choose
the means to reduce the country’s excessive deficit, which was the objective set out in the
Council Decision. Recognising the difficulty with showing direct concern, AG Wathelet
concludes that it is now up to the national courts of recipient Member States to assess the
compliance of a Member State with EU law where the contested measures are implementing
65 Recital 3 of Regulation 472/2013, 2013, OJ L 140/1.
66 This link has also been demonstrated in the literature. See C. Kilpatrick, 2014; M. Ioannidis, 2014; A. Poulou,
2014.
67 Judgment of 15 July 1963, Case 25-62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission of the European Economic Community.
68 Case T-541/10, ADEDY and Others v. Council, [2012] ECR I-626.
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conditions of the MoU that are repeated in Council Decisions (paras 91 and 96). In this
regard, Member States are bound to provide ‘remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal
protection’ (Art. 19(1) TEU), including the possibility for national courts “to refer to the
[ECJ] for a preliminary ruling questions on the validity of implementing decisions and
the compatibility of macroeconomic adjustment programmes with the [TFEU], the general
principles of EU law and the Charter” (Para. 98).
At the very least, the AG’s analysis is noteworthy because it is the first time that Regu-
lation No. 472/2013 features in an ECJ case. Although the role of the Regulation as a ‘bridge’
between EU law and ESM financial assistance conditionality had been analysed in the lit-
erature,69 the AG explains his own understanding of how the Regulation can come into
play in future instances where individuals wish to challenge MoU measures. In addition,
the AG’s Opinion can be of help to future claimants regarding the Cyprus haircut because
it supports the view that the Council Decision 2013/236 addressed to Cyprus70 turned the
haircut of deposits into a legally binding obligation for the Republic of Cyprus (Para. 134).
This line of argument could potentially be used to show that the Republic of Cyprus was
implementing EU law when enforcing the haircut.71 It remains to be seen whether, and to
what extent, the ECJ will engage with the same issues in its final judgment, especially given
that the AG made these remarks as preliminary observations before considering the actual
grounds of appeal in the case at hand.
The second issue arising from the two cases concerns the role of EU institutions –
especially the Commission – in the financial assistance mechanisms.72 In agreement with
the GC, AG Wathelet clarifies in his Opinion that the Eurogroup cannot be considered
an EU institution, office, body or agency and thus acts of the Eurogroup concerning
financial assistance conditionality cannot be annulled on the basis of Article 263 TFEU
(Para. 67). AG Wahl focuses on the obligations of the Commission under the ESMT, and
the interpretation of the Commission’s duty to “ensure that the [MoUs] concluded by the
ESM are consistent with European Union law.”73 His starting point is that “even when
acting outside the EU framework, EU institutions must scrupulously observe EU law”
(Para. 69). Nonetheless, he draws a distinction between a positive and a negative dimension
69 See supra fn. 66.
70 Council Decision of 25 April 2013 addressed to Cyprus on specific measures to restore financial stability
and sustainable growth, [2013] OJ L 141/32. The Decision was replaced by Council Implementing Decision
2013/463/EU of 13 September 2013 on approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme for Cyprus
[2013] OJ L 250/40.
71 However, the AG does not delve further into this point and hence does not explain how the haircut was
turned into a legal obligation by a Decision taken after the haircut had already taken place. A look at the
timeline of the financial assistance given to Cyprus indicates that the resolution measures (set out in Decrees
103 and 104) were executed on 29 March 2013 and the Council Decision 2013/236 was adopted on 25 April
2013.
72 AG Wahl, para. 1.
73 Case C-370/12, Pringle, para. 164.
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of the Commission’s duties.74 With regard to the negative dimension, the AG states what
the Commission cannot do: “[it] may not deliberately breach EU rules” and “may not
contribute, through its conduct, to an infringement of the EU rules committed by other
entities or bodies” (Para. 69). However, in the AG’s view this should be distinguished from
a positive dimension of the Commission’s duties that would require the Commission “to
avert any possible conflict or tension” between an ESM act and any applicable EU rule
(Para. 70). In the view of the AG, there is no such positive obligation of the Commission
when acting under the ESMT.
Assuming, however, that there is both a positive and a negative dimension to the
Commission’s duty under the ESMT, the AG also examines whether the signature of the
MoU “resulted in a possible breach of EU law which the Commission should have averted”
(Para. 82). Although he concurs with the argument that the Commission should respect
the Charter when acting outside the EU legal framework, the AG argues that this position
falls short of imposing an obligation on the Commission “to impose the standards of the
EU Charter on acts which are adopted by other entities or bodies acting outside the EU
legal framework” (Para. 85). The ECJ may take the AG’s Opinion as an opportunity to
clarify the applicability of the Charter to the EU institutions when acting under the ESMT,
an issue which was left open in Pringle.
34.2 Concluding Remarks
The two AG Opinions in Mallis and Ledra raise interesting points regarding the extent to
which individuals can challenge the conditionality attached to financial assistance under
the ESM. There is little value in speculating about the outcome of the appeals. The preceding
discussion attempted to touch upon some of the issues that could concern the ECJ in the
near future. The two future ECJ’s judgments are crucial not only because they are an
opportunity to clarify some of the matters left open in Pringle, but also in respect of other
pending cases where individuals are challenging conditionality measures attached to
financial assistance under the ESM.75
This article has sought to provide an overview of some of the attempts to challenge
austerity measures adopted by Eurozone Member States in receipt of financial assistance.
As we have seen from the tour d’horizon of the national litigation in Portugal, Greece, and
Cyprus, judicial control by national higher courts has taken place to a varying extent. The
differences between the macroeconomic adjustment programmes designed for each
74 For a discussion of the two dimensions see A. Poulou, 2014, p. 1159.
75 See, for example, Case T-405/14, Yavorskaya v. Council and Others, action brought on 31 May 2014; Case
C-161/15, Brinkmann (Steel Trading) a.o. v. Commission and ECB, action brought on 1 April 2015; Case
T-786/14 Bourdouvali e.a./Council e.a., action brought on 1 December 2014.
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Member State; the type of review exercised by each Member State’s highest court; the tra-
ditions of each court regarding the exercise of judicial restraint; the incomplete picture of
the case law at national level; as well as the on-going litigation at the CJEU, warrant a
careful approach towards drawing overarching conclusions from the judgments discussed
in this contribution – at least for the time being. In spite of this ‘cautionary note’, future
country-by-country case studies mapping in depth the development of the national-, and
EU-level case law could assist in drawing conclusions regarding the extent of judicial
protection afforded to individuals by national and EU courts when it comes to challenging
financial assistance conditionality.
To conclude, anyone interested in the judicial developments concerning the Eurozone
bailouts should keep a close eye on the upcoming ‘episodes’ in the saga of litigation briefly
described in this article. In addition to the forthcoming ECJ judgments in the appeals
discussed above, pending cases include those against EU institutions vis-à-vis the Cyprus
bail-in. Some of these cases in fact add to the list of questions to be clarified by the CJEU.
For instance, one of the pending cases consists of a claim for damages on the basis of
Article 340 TFEU against not only the Commission and the ECB, but also the Council of
the European Union, the ‘EU represented by the Commission’, and ‘the Eurogroup repre-
sented by the Council of the EU.’76 The applicants argue that the bail-in measures adopted
by the Republic of Cyprus ‘were introduced solely in order to implement measures adopted
by the defendants, and were also approved by the defendant institutions.’As for the grounds
of review, the applicants not only invoke their right to property under the Charter (Art.
17(1), Article 1 of Protocol 1), but also argue that the EU institutions breached the principles
of proportionality, protection of legitimate expectations and non-discrimination. Future
CJEU judgments could therefore further illustrate the role of the EU vis-à-vis conditionality
for financial assistance, and especially the links, and the dividing lines, between the EU
legal order and the ESMT.
76 Case T-680/13, K. Chrysostomides & Co. e.a. v. Council e.a., action brought on 20 December 2013.
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